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1An Evaluation of the Chemical Weapons Convention
and the U.S. National Interest
Introduction
In January 1993, 149 nations signed the Convention on the Prohibition of Development, Production,
Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, hereinafter referred to as the Chemical
Weapons Convention, or CWC. This date marked the culmination of decades of arms control negotiations
aimed at eliminating chemical weapons. The Convention is scheduled to enter into force 180 days after the
sixty-fifth state party has deposited the instruments of ratification to the United Nations secretary general (Article
XXI.1). Hungary became the sixty-fifth state to ratify the CWC on November 31, 1996, setting the entry-into-
force (EIF) date at April 29, 1997.
On the eve of this watershed event, the United States stands at a crucial point in its history as a world
leader. A champion of chemical weapon (CW) arms control for decades, the United States remains undecided on
the ratification of the CWC. This paper will argue that U.S. ratification prior to the April 29 EIF date is crucial
to the success of the Convention, the perpetuation of the U.S. international leadership position, and the pursuit
of the national interest.
The paper will be divided into two sections. The first will discuss the historical context of chemical
weapons and international efforts to prohibit their use. I will describe the properties and composition of CW
agents, providing a context for discussion of verification and “dual-use” technology issues. I will also give an
account of the historical use of CWs, from medieval times to the present day; this history reveals that chemical
weapons have generally been regarded as immoral. The next section will trace the evolution of CW arms
control, which began in the seventeenth century. This history will reveal the difficulties that have plagued
previous attempts at CW disarmament and provide further context for my analysis of contemporary solutions
embodied in the CWC. Lastly, I will provide an overview of the proposed Organization for the Prohibition of
Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the regime empowered to implement the Convention.
The second section of the paper will address the main issues in the current U.S. debate over CWC
ratification. First, I will address verification and compliance issues. The Convention is the most far-reaching
arms control treaty ever constructed, with an organization aimed at deterring CW use and providing the mutual
trust necessary for states to ratify the treaty. This section’s main aims are to weigh the merits of the Convention
as opposed to a world without the CWC, as well as the impact that U.S. ratification will have on both the
success of the Convention and the future of U.S. national interests.
One of the more contentious issues surrounding the Convention is the legal status of riot control agents
(RCAs). The Articles of the CWC are vague in this area, which has led to conflicting interpretations. A
definitive analysis of the Convention’s intent, based on established standards of international law, will clarify
the legality of RCA use in several different military and law enforcement scenarios.
Next, I will analyze the effect of the Convention on the U.S. chemical industry. The chemical industry has
supported the Convention for over twenty years and has influenced the negotiation of the treaty. I will argue that
the failure of the United States to ratify the CWC will have devastating consequences for the U.S. chemical
industry, sharply reducing exports in one of the few areas of U.S. trade which yields a net surplus. Further, U.S.
failure to ratify the Convention will weaken the credibility of U.S. leadership, as well as the effectiveness of the
CWC’s enforcement capabilities.
Lastly, the intrusiveness of the verification regime, especially as concerns the private sector, has raised
several constitutional questions. The warrantless inspection regime proposed by the CWC fails to meet the
standards established by the Supreme Court for legal searches, but implementing legislation accompanying the
ratification of the Convention will allow the United States to comply with the treaty without trampling
constitutional rights.
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The United States has long stood at the forefront of an international coalition against chemical weapons.
After seven decades of attempts to negotiate a global CW ban, the failure of the U.S. Senate to ratify the CWC
would amount to nothing less than an abdication of international leadership, damaging both the effectiveness of
the Convention and U.S. foreign policy goals. As former Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger contended,
The Chemical Weapons Convention is an important part of an international structure that would increase
U.S. and global security in the next century. If we do not lead this effort to curb the proliferation of chemical
weapons and initiate their global elimination, we increase the chances that we will encounter disasters in
the twenty-first century reminiscent of those that occurred in the first fifty years of the twentieth century
(ACA CWC Quotations Fact Sheet, 5).
The CWC’s Historical and Functional Context
Chemical Weapons
A review of the types of chemical agents developed throughout the twentieth century, as well as verification of
their use in warfare, is important for establishing a clear conception of the verification dilemma posed by the
CWC. Often, the precursors of CWs are chemicals which can be found in common industrial production
facilities. Additionally, the high toxicity of some CWs, such as nerve agents or biological toxins, means that
even relatively small amount of agents can cause widespread injury and death. The classification of chemical
weapons, which is based on their properties and composition, has a direct bearing in the success of the
verification regime.
The physical and chemical properties of chemical weapons vary significantly, and the choice of specific
agents for use in warfare is often based on the intended military objective. Lethality is the classification used to
describe the intended injury, that is, to kill or not to kill. Non-lethal agents, such as tear gas and other riot
control agents, are intended to incapacitate the enemy and eliminate his will to fight. However, the distinction
between lethal and non-lethal is not exact, as high concentrations of non-lethal agents, combined with long
exposure times, can kill a person. For example, high concentrations of CS, a standard tear gas agent, in a
confined area, can overwhelm the respiratory system and cause death (Spiers, 3).
The mode of action describes the means by which the agent penetrates the body and affects the biological
systems. Passive agents inflict injury by exposure through inhalation or percutaneous means, such as absorption
into the mucous membranes, the skin, or the eyes. Some poisons act orally, inflicting damage on the digestive
system or attacking the bloodstream.
The delay between one’s exposure to an agent and the time it takes for the symptoms of exposure to occur
is the speed of action. Again, the tactical nature of the agent is often based on this effect. A fast acting agent,
such as nerve gas, could be utilized in a surprise attack, while slower acting agents, such as mustard gas, might
be employed if the desired military objective were to soften up defensive positions over a longer period of time.
Persistency measures the time that the agent continues to pose a hazard on the battlefield. An agent with a
low persistency level would be volatile, resulting in quick evaporation. The use of such an agent in a combat
area would be based on the desire to occupy the area in question and to ensure the safety of one’s own troops
after the agent has incapacitated the enemy. An agent with a high persistency level would be employed if the
military objective was area denial or the protection of supply lines (Spiers, 2).
Lastly, toxicity refers to the quantity of agent needed to achieve a goal, be it incapacitation, injury, or death.
It is in this area that CW development has seen the most improvement. Phosgene, a standard World War I
choking agent, requires 3,200 milligrams per cubic meter of air to kill 50 percent of those exposed. The nerve
agent sarin, developed in 1938, requires only 70 milligrams to inflict an equal death rate (Spiers, 54). It should
be noted that lethality figures are not military field-use models, which have demonstrated a lower lethality rate
for equal concentrations of the above agents. In a battlefield situation, the concentration of agent reaching a
soldier would be lower than the toxicity figures listed above. This is attributable to environmental conditions,
such as wind, temperature, and topography. Warfighting estimates indicate that one ton of persistent agent, such
as mustard gas, would be sufficient to cover approximately one square mile of territory and inflict a 50 percent
casualty rate.
Evaluation of the Chemical Weapons Convention 3
Chemical weapon agents fall under several classifications based on the type of injury they inflict and the
mode of action. Of the first generation of agents developed and used in World War I, the primary CWs
employed were choking agents, blood agents, and blister or vesicant, agents. The classic World War I CW was
the choking agent, which includes chlorine and phosgene (Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, 47).
The mode of action for these agents is inhalation. The cause of death is pulmonary edema, in which fluid from
the bloodstream builds up in the lungs, resulting in the fatal accumulation of plasma, causing the victim to
drown (Spiers, 4). These agents, due to their gaseous nature, are nonpersistent (CBW Threat, 2). By modern
standards, their toxicity is relatively low, and their battlefield utility is limited by the fact that the released
agent has a distinctive smell, which provides an early warning (Spiers 4). Phosgene and its precursors have
numerous industrial uses (Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, 37).
Blood agents are absorbed into the body by inhalation and cause death by blocking the circulation of
oxygen within the bloodstream (Spiers, 5). Common blood agents include hydrogen cyanide and cyanogen
chlorine. These agents are highly toxic and non-persistent, with a rapid speed of action (OPCW Webpage). It
has been alleged that hydrogen cyanide was used extensively by the Iraqis against both the Iranians and the
Kurds in the 1980’s (OPCW Webpage). Concentrations as low as 120–150 milligrams per cubic meter of air
can kill in thirty to sixty minutes, while lethality at concentrations of 300 milligrams per cubic meter of air or
above is instantaneous (OPCW Webpage). Hydrogen cyanide and its chemical precursors have multiple
industrial applications (Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, 37).
The last category of first generation agents are blister agents  or vesicants. Due to their high persistency,
these agents, notably sulfur mustard, nitrogen mustard, and lewisite, were frequently employed for the purposes
of area denial. Vesicants have multiple modes of action, both respiratory and percutaneous. Lethality through
inhalation occurs at extremely high concentrations, 1500 milligrams per cubic meter of air, and 10,000
milligrams per cubic meter of air by skin exposure, concentrations which would be difficult to attain on a
battlefield (OPCW Webpage). Their primary purpose is to inflict injury. Exposure to the skin and the eyes can
cause severe burns and blisters, while inhalation can result in damage to the respiratory system and internal
organs (CBW Threat, 3). Mustard agents were the most widely stockpiled CW agent in World War II (Spiers,
5). Lewisite has a higher lethality rate than mustard gases, but the agent has a distinct odor and causes
immediate eye discomfort, serving to warn the potential victim of its use. Additionally, lewisite’s persistency
in humid and wet conditions is significantly less than mustard agents (CBW Threat, 3).
Mustard agents are relatively simple to produce and are often the first agent sought by states seeking to
acquire a CW capability (OPCW Webpage 2). Production methods are widely known, and the required
precursors have multiple dual-use applications. For example, nitrogen mustard precursors are used in cancer
chemotherapy (Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, 37). Additionally, as the Office of Technology
Assessment (OTA) reports, “thiodiglycol, a sulfur-containing solvent used in ballpoint pen ink and other
legitimate products, is easily converted to mustard agent in a one-step process” (The Chemical Weapons
Convention, 7).
The second and third generation of CWs were nerve agents, that is, organophosphorus compounds. Second
generation nerve agents, the G-series, were discovered in the inter-war period. The first such discovery was
made by a German scientist, Doctor Gerhard Schradar, who discovered tabun (GA) in 1936 while conducting
research on insecticides (Spiers, 5, 54). This class of nerve agents also includes sarin (GB) and soman (GD).
The G-series of agents works nearly instantaneously, is non-persistent, and has a high rate of lethality (CBW
Threat, 3). The agent is absorbed by the skin or by inhalation. Nerve agents inhibit the action of
acetylcholinesterase, an enzyme responsible for transmitting nerve impulses (Spiers, 6). The result is the
disruption and paralysis of the nervous and respiratory system, causing death (CBW Threat, 3; Proliferation of
Weapons of Mass Destruction, 47).
The third generation of agents were the V-series nerve agents, first developed at the British Chemical
Defense Establishment at Porton Down in the 1950’s (Spiers, 71). V-series agents are related to the G-series
agents but have a higher toxicity and persistency (CBW Threat, 3). As with the mustard agents, nerve agents
have numerous dual-use applications. For example, phosphorus trichloride, used to produce VG, sarin, and
tabun, has civilian uses in organic synthesis, gasoline additives, and insecticides (CBW Threat, 10).
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The definition of toxic chemicals, a subset of CW criteria, covers:
any chemical which through its chemical action on life processes can cause death, temporary incapacitation
or permanent harms to humans or animals. This includes all such chemicals, regardless of their origin or their
method of production. (Article II.2).
These criteria include toxins, defined as non-living toxic substances which are produced by biological
organisms or are synthesized to yield similar versions (Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, 3). The
growth of the genetic engineering industry, combined with strides in biotechnology, have made toxins a viable
potential agent (Harr, 28). Their mode of action is inhalation and due to their chemical makeup, they have a
low persistency level (OPCW Webpage). Ricin, a toxin the Soviet Union is known to have synthesized in its
biological weapons development program, is lethal at very low concentrations (Proliferation of Weapons of
Mass Destruction, 47). The low-persistency and delayed speed of action of toxins suggests that they have a
higher utility for terrorist use.
The last type of CW agents are non-lethal agents. Their characteristics include non-persistence, immediate
speed of action, and reliance on inhalation as the mode of action (CBW Threat, 4). One such category is tear
gas. Tear gas agents include chloroacetophenone (CN) and chorobezalmalonitrile (CS) (Spiers, 3). These agents
are designed to cause the temporary incapacitation of victims, with effects ranging from irritating sensations to
the eyes, sneezing and coughing, itching of the skin, and stinging of the orifices (Spiers, 3).
Another subset of non-lethal agents are incapacitating agents. Vomiting agents, non-lethal but capable of
causing great discomfort, are standard riot control agents (RCAs). Adamsite (DM), developed in 1918, has a
slower speed of action than the tear gas agents, but its effects are more intense, causing severe headaches and
vomiting (Spiers, 2). Phychochemcials, such as LSD and benactylamide (BZ) formerly a standard U.S. agent,
affect the nervous system, causing hallucination and loss of concentration. These agents were removed from CW
arsenals due to their unpredictable effects (CBW Threat, 4).
The agents described above and their precursors all fall under the CWC Schedule 1 and 2 guidelines for
chemicals. By definition, their status as a developed chemical weapon or as a precursor in the final technological
stage of production of a toxic chemical is regarded as posing a risk to the purpose and object of the Convention
(Annex of Chemicals A,1 (a)–(c); 2, (a)–(c)).
Historical Use of CW Agents
The Medieval Era. The modern use of CWs in warfare began with World War I, but historical records indicate
their presence even in the medieval era. This usage focused on irritants or poisonous smoke, employing wind as
a means of dispersal. In 600 BC, the Athenians defeated their enemies by poisoning their drinking water
(Utgoff, 1). The Spartans were said to have used sulfur fumes in their sieges against Platea and Velium in 431–
401 BC (Spiers, 13). Even biological agents have an early history of use. During the French and Indian War,
Sir Jeffery Amherst gave Indians, aligned with the French, blankets used by British troops that were infected
with smallpox, resulting in a devastating epidemic (Utgoff, 1). These examples of use prior to World War I
suggest several conclusions. In many cases, CW agents had a significant effect in warfare. Second, a major
impediment to the use of large of amounts of CW agents in warfare was the absence of a sizable chemical
industry capable of producing standardized agents at a militarily significant level. Lastly, chemical weapons
have been historically regarded as immoral. The nature of the injuries which they cause and their denial of one’s
ability to escape death through retreat or surrender contributed to this label (Utgoff, 3).
World War I. World War I marked the first use of chemical weapons in modern warfare. One hundred and
thirteen thousand tons of chemical agents were used in combat (Kaplow, 8). The tonnage of agents used
increased markedly in the later years of the war as more lethal and persistent agents were introduced. The first
recorded chemical attack of World War I was initiated by Germany. In April 1915, the Germans launched a
chlorine gas attack—designed to weaken defenses and prepare for an assault—against French troops at
Langmarck. Allied forces were largely unprotected, and the attack caused over 15,000 casualties. Interestingly,
the German High Command underestimated the tactical value of CWs and failed to allocate an adequate number
of troops sufficient to exploit the eight kilometer hole produced in Allied lines (Utgoff, 5). Germany’s initiation
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of chemical warfare led to a rapid escalation of use and to the development of new, more lethal agents.
Paralleling the development and production of agents with greater lethality was the development of protective
equipment and rudimentary early warning systems (Utgoff, 5). This symmetry between the development of
more lethal agents and improved CW protection systems continues to the present day.
As the war progressed, both sides introduced new training procedures for combat in a chemical environment
(Utgoff, 9). Over the next three years, seventeen different agents were employed by all belligerents, including
phosgene, hydrogen cyanide, and sulfur mustard. The first lethal gas utilized, again by Germany, was
diphosgene, dispersed in artillery shells. In July 1917, the Germans first used mustard gas. The inability of
existing protective equipment to work properly against new agents, such as mustard gas and phosgene, resulted
in casualties on a mass scale. CWs use in World War I resulted in nearly 1.3 million military and civilian
casualties and almost 100,000 deaths (CBW Threat, 1).
CW Use in the Third World. The use of chemical weapons since World War I has been restricted to Third
World conflicts. The massive stockpiles accumulated by the major powers served as a deterrent in World War
II. The legacy of CWs in World War I influenced their non-use in this conflict. Hitler, who himself was a
victim of a gas attack at Ypres in October 1918, is said to have ordered non-use, for fear of Allied retaliation
against German troops (Spiers, 78). Late in the war, when the tide had turned against Germany, records indicate
that Hitler reevaluated this position, particularly in regard to the Russian front, but a lack of support among the
German high command dissuaded him from initiating CW attacks (Utgoff, 56). Similarly, while Japan used
CWs extensively against China, the fear of retaliation and the capabilities of the large U.S. chemical industry,
deterred CW use against allied troops (Utgoff, 48).
The use of CWs in Third World conflicts has proved difficult to verify. Often, claims of chemical agent use
are propaganda tools, which are spread to the media as deliberate disinformation (Robinson, 41). Allegations of
CW use attempt to influence public opinion by shifting the moral high ground from one side to another.
Frequently, such disinformation is intended to influence international opinion against an aggressor, such as
unverified claims of CW use by China against Taiwan in 1958 or North Korean allegations of U.S. CW use in
the Korean conflict (Robinson, 42).
However, several instances of CW use in the post-World War I era have been verified. In the 1930’s,
Mussolini’s Italy used mustard gas against Ethiopia in the Abyssian conflict (Spiers, 53). In addition, Japanese
use of chemical and biological agents against Chinese civilian populations from 1937 to 1945 has been
authenticated. Chinese reports, generally regarded as accurate, indicate that over 1,000 independent gas attacks,
with agents such as CN, hydrogen cyanide, phosgene, mustard gas, and lewisite, caused more than 26,000
casualties (Spiers, 99). In fact, the large stocks of abandoned Japanese CWs on Chinese soil were the major
impetus for the official Convention position on old and abandoned CWs (Verification Annex IV). The clause
obligates the abandoning state party to provide financial and technical assistance to remove the agents
(Verification Annex, IV, C, 15).
Egyptian intervention in the Yemenese Civil War saw the use of both phosgene and mustard gas between
1963 and 1967 (Robinson, 45). While reports allege over forty independent incidents of CW use, only three
were verified by independent international inspectors (Kaplow, 10). The most recent, internationally verified
instances of poison gas warfare have been Iraqi use against Iran and the Iraqi Kurds. In 1982, in an attempt to
stop Iranian counter-offenses, Iraq utilized tear gas (Utgoff, 81). Bolstered by its success, Iraq relied increasingly
on both mustard gas and, in smaller quantities, the nerve agent Tabun to counter Iranian “human wave” attacks
(Utgoff, 81). U.S. estimates indicate that Iraqi CW use caused over 50,000 casualties (Proliferation of Weapons
of Mass Destruction, 10). The conflict escalated as Iran countered Iraqi CW use with its own agents, phosgene
and mustard gas, in 1987 (Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, 83). Both Iranian and Iraqi use was
verified by U.N. inspectors and declassified U.S. intelligence reports (Proliferation of Weapons of Mass
Destruction, 83). The psychological impact of CWs in the Iran–Iraq War, an evaluation which is representative
of the impact of CW use in any conflict, was examined in a recent United States Office of Technology
Assessment report.
[CWs] had a critical effect on Iranian military and civilian morale by late 1987, and during the Iraqi counter-
offensives and “war of the cities” in 1988. Sheer killing power is not the level of measure of success: It is
6 Jeffery M. Heftman
rather the strategic, tactical, and psycho-political impact of the use of such weapons. Even when troops are
equipped with defensive gear, they often feel they are defenseless and break and run after limited losses.
Populations which fear chemical attacks may well cease to support a conflict (Proliferation of Weapons of
Mass Destruction, 58–59).
Iraq also used mustard gas against Kurds on its own territory in the late 1980s. Due to the Kurds lack of
protective equipment, the casualty rate was high (Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, 10). Iraqi CW
use against the Kurds highlights the shortcomings of the Geneva Protocol of 1925, to be discussed in the next
section. The prevailing interpretation of that text outlaws the use of poison gas in conflicts between states
parties (Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements, 15). However, CW use in internal conflicts, such as a
civil war or against subnational groups, is not a violation of international law under the Geneva Protocol.
Arms Control History
The completion of negotiations for the CWC in September 1992 marked the culmination of over twenty-five
years of work, but the history of chemical arms control is much longer. A review of this history provides the
context for today’s CWC debate, as many of the issues which served to derail past attempts to counter CW
proliferation and use are still of major concern.
Prior to the negotiation of the Geneva Protocol of 1925, several attempts were made to exclude CWs from
warfare. German and French Armies signed the Strassburg treaty in 1675. Article 57 of this agreement calls for a
ban on the military use of poison bullets (Utgoff, 3). The Brussels Declaration of 1874, the Hague Gas
Projectile Declaration of 1899, and the Hague Resolution of 1907 sought to codify an international stigma
against the use of CWs. The Hague International Peace Conferences marked the first attempts to directly address
CWs (Koplow, 16). The large-scale use of CWs during World War I illustrated the inadequacies of these
previous attempts to prohibit the use of poison gases in warfare; but the impact of CWs on the conflict and the
number of casualties produced provided the impetus for negotiating the 1925 Geneva Protocol. The Protocol
bans the use of poisonous and asphyxiating gases as a method of warfare (Arms Control and Disarmament
Agreements, 15).
The negotiation of the Geneva Protocol began in the League of Nations. Seeking to avoid the horrors of
World War I, League members convened in a 1925 Conference “for the supervision of the international trade in
arms and ammunition and in implements of war” (Robinson, 39). The focus of the Convention turned to
chemical warfare when the U.S. delegation proposed a ban on the trade and transfer of toxic chemicals. The
conference rejected the proposal on the basis that a general ban on toxic materials would establish a
discriminatory regime favoring those states with self-sufficient domestic chemical industries, creating have and
have-not CW states. Instead, the conference simply banned the practice of chemical warfare between states.
Biological weapons and toxins were added at the request of the Polish delegation (Zanders, 39).
While the Geneva Convention was a first step towards today’s CWC, its shortfalls are numerous. As
interpreted by a majority of its over 150 signatories, the Geneva Protocol is a no first-use treaty. The
production, stockpiling, testing, and transfer of chemical weapons is not prohibited. Most states have advocated
a policy of retaliation in kind in regard to chemical attack. Furthermore, as noted earlier, CW use in internal
conflicts is not prohibited.
Political disagreements, much like the ones which have delayed the CWC ratification process today,
prevented the United States from ratifying the Geneva Protocol until 1975 (Kaplow, 17). Vigorous lobbying by
the chemical industry and veterans groups prevented a vote on the Protocol in the Senate. In the aftermath of
World War I, the U.S. chemical industry sought to publicize the deadly effects of chemical warfare, with the
intention of raising public support for a strong chemical industry, capable of deterring CW attack by threat of
responding in kind (Utgoff, xx). The industry, which at the time had a strong financial interest in CW
production, lobbied successfully against ratification of the Protocol, arguing that a significant CW capability
was essential to U.S. security (The Chemical Weapons Convention, 10).
The scope of the Geneva Protocol on CW use also divided U.S. policy makers. The status of non-lethal
weapons and riot control agents, which the United States held were excluded from the Geneva Protocol, was a
divisive issue (Kaplow, 18). President Nixon resubmitted the Protocol in 1969. At this time, Nixon reiterated
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the U.S. policy of no-first use, while reserving the right to retaliate in kind, and renounced offensive biological
weapons in the U.S. order of battle (Utgoff, 12). The Senate finally ratified the Geneva Protocol in 1975
(Kaplow, 19).
In the meantime, the 1960’s saw the return of chemical arms control negotiations. The subject of chemical
and biological warfare (CBW) was raised during U.S.–Soviet nuclear arms control negotiations. Ultimately, in
1968, the Cold War rivals accepted a Swedish proposal that the issue of chemical weapons be submitted to the
Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENCD) the Geneva multilateral negotiations convention
(Robinson, 48). One impetus for the resumption of CBW arms control negotiations was the verified use of
phosgene and mustard gas by Egyptian forces against Yemen in 1967. The United States use of pesticides and
herbicides in Vietnam brought further attention to the use of chemical agents in warfare (Robinson, 48).
Actual negotiation of the CWC began in 1984, after the Iraqi introduction of lethal CW agents into its
ongoing conflict with Iran (Robinson, 50). U.S. negotiators insisted on a stringent verification regime, calling
for “anytime, anywhere” on-site inspections. Moscow opposed these intrusive verification standards until 1987,
when Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev sought a rapprochement with the West. At this time, Gorbachev also
announced the cessation of Soviet CW production, research, and development (Robinson, 50). Bilateral
negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union continued, leading to the signing of the 1989
Wyoming Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) (Utgoff, 125). This agreement included the stringent
verification standards advocated by the United States in 1984. Destruction was slated to begin in 1992, and a
mutual retention of 5,000 tons of CWs was permitted until the end of the destruction plan, in 2002 (Robinson,
50). The status of the Wyoming MOU and another agreement, the Bilateral Destruction Agreement (BDA), will
be reviewed later in this paper.
The superpowers agreement on verification measures removed a major roadblock to the conclusion of the
CWC (Utgoff, 126). In the aftermath of the Gulf War, President Bush withdrew the United States right to retain
5,000 tons of agent, sufficiently reassured that overwhelming conventional responses, as opposed to retaliation
in kind, would serve as an adequate deterrent. As negotiations continued, the United States retreated from its
earlier demands for stringent verification measures in an attempt to prevent the loss of sensitive military
technology during on-site inspections. Instead of the previous “anytime, anywhere” regime, the U.S.
negotiators called for a “level of verification that gives us confidence to go forward with the ban” (Flowerree, 5).
The ambiguity inherent in this phrase was the basis for resistance from the majority of states present at the
negotiations in Geneva. In 1992, the United States compromised, reaffirming its support for the verification
standards it had originally introduced (Robinson, 52). In January 1993, the Convention was signed by 149
nations in Paris. The Convention was deposited with the U.N. secretary general, initiating a ratification process
which would trigger the entry into force clause when 65 states has ratified the CWC.
The OPCW
Article VIII of the CWC establishes the general provisions of the implementing organization. The Organization
for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) is the legally recognized international institution given the
powers to carry out the provisions of the Convention, including the verification regime, and to serve as the
venue for cooperation and mediation among states parties (Article VIII A.1). The Convention authorizes the
formation of three institutional organs: the Conference of the States Parties, the Executive Council, and the
Technical Secretariat (Article VIII.A.4). The Headquarters of the OPCW is to be in the Hague (Article
VIII.A.3).
The Conference of the States Parties, or the “conference,” will consist of one representative from each
member state, each of whom will have one vote (Article VIII.B.9; VIII.B.17). The conference is scheduled to
convene for its first session no later than thirty days after the Convention enters into force (Article VIII.B.10).
Regular sessions are to be held on an annual basis, but guidelines for special sessions of the conference are also
enumerated (VIII.B.11). A state party is permitted to call a special session of the conference if, for example, it
feels that another state party is in non-compliance with the Convention, or to seek consultation on a decision
made by the OPCW (Article VIII.B.12). Voting procedures are clearly outlined. The presence of a majority of
conference representatives, or their designated alternates, constitutes a quorum (Article VIII.B.16). Procedural
issues are to be determined by majority vote. For matters of substance, though, a consensus must be sought. If
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a consensus appears unattainable, a 24-hour deferment period will be instituted, in order to attempt to achieve
one. At the conclusion of the 24-hour period, a two-thirds majority of voting members will determine the
conference decision (Article VIII.B.18).
An example of a substantive issue to be addressed within the conference is the existence of disputes between
members, such as the terms of assistance between a nation which abandoned CWs on another state’s territory,
and the state in which the CWs were abandoned. The conference will serve as the principal organ for the
OPCW, with the right to determine the parameters of the Convention’s authority, as well as the powers and
functions of the executive council and the technical secretariat (Article VIII.B.19). At the first session of the
conference, a director-general of the technical secretariat will be appointed, members of the executive council will
be elected, and the voluntary fund for assistance, outlined in Article X, will be established (Article VIII.B.c–d).
The executive organ of the Convention, the executive council, is charged with ensuring the implementation
of, and compliance with, the Convention (Article VIII.C.30). The council, after receiving the budget from the
technical secretariat, will evaluate it and submit it to the conference for approval (Article VIII.C.32.a). The
executive council has the right to negotiate agreements and treaties with other states or international
organizations (Article VIII.C.34.a). Issues of compliance raised by state parties, and redress against the non-
compliance of states parties, will be addressed in the council (Article VIII.C.36).
The composition of the executive council varies significantly from that of the Conference of States Parties.
The council will consist of forty-one members serving two-year terms (Article VIII.C.23). A principle of
rotation, based on regional distribution and the size of the members chemical industries, will serve as the basis
for determining the composition of the council (Article VIII.C.23). The forty-one membership slots of the
executive council are structured to ensure the representation of all regions. Within each regional zone, a preset
number of seats are automatically reserved for the states parties with the largest chemical industries (Article
23.C). The determination of the size of members chemical industries will be reevaluated every year, based on
internationally reported data declarations. Table 1 details the distribution of seats within regions, and the
number of positions reserved for states parties with sizable chemical industries (Article VIII.23.C.(a)–(e)).
The remaining position is reserved for states parties within the Asia and Latin America–Caribbean regions,
with the seat rotating among the regions and the members within them (Article VIII.C.23.f).
The technical secretariat is the body charged with implementing of the verification regime (Article
VIII.D.37). As noted, the verification budget for the OPCW will be prepared by the technical secretariat and
submitted to the executive council for review (Article VIII.D.38.(b)). The international inspectorate is
designated as a unit under the authority of the secretariat (Article VIII.D.42). Responsibilities include
implementing on-site inspections, serving as the point of contact for states parties alleging others non-
compliance and providing support to the National Authority of States Parties (Article VIII.D.38.(e); D.40).
The financial obligations of the Convention are modeled on the scale of assessments of the United Nations,
adjusted for differences in the composition of membership (Article VIII.A.7). The OPCW budget is divided into
two sections, administrative costs and verification expenses (Article VIII.E.48). The United States obligation
would be 24.96 percent of total OPCW operating costs (Senate Foreign Relations Committee Report, 9). The
other major contributors to the OPCW budget, and their percentage of financial obligations, include: Japan
(13.92 percent), Germany (8.93 percent), France (6.31 percent), Russia (5.67 percent), and the United Kingdom
(5.26 percent) (Senate Foreign Relations, 9). One key distinction between the funding mechanism of the United
Nations and the OPCW is that an OPCW clause withholds voting rights for members which fail to meet their
financial obligations. Aimed at preventing the accumulation of unmet financial commitments, a state party will
TABLE 1 Executive Council Seat Allocation
Region Number of Seats Number of Seats Reserved
Africa 9 3
Asia 9 4
Eastern Europe 5 1
L. America–Caribbean 7 3
W. Europe–Other States 10 5
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have its voting privileges withheld if the accumulated debt exceeds two fiscal years worth of OPCW obligations
(Article VIII.A.8).
The costs of destroying CW stockpiles and the verification of CW storage and destruction are to be
assumed by the individual member (Article IV.16). At the request of U.S. negotiators, the verification costs of
monitoring the implementation of bilateral agreements consistent with the purpose of the Convention, such as
the United States–Russian Bilateral Destruction Agreement, are to be assumed by member states not party to
the bilateral agreement (Senate Foreign Relations, 9). To avoid redundancy and limit excessive costs, OPCW
inspections of activities implemented under bilateral agreements will be limited to complementary measures
(Article IV.13.(a)). However, the OPCW reserves the right to monitor the implementation of the bilateral
agreement (Article IV.14).
Verification
The verification regime envisioned by the CWC is more far reaching and intrusive than any arms control
agreement in history. Due to the ease with which CWs can be produced and the potential for concealment of
relatively small facilities, stringent verification standards, including on-site inspections (OSIs), were deemed
necessary in order to ensure compliance and deter potential violations. No treaty can be expected to provide 100
percent compliance with its objectives; rather, the Convention will attempt to increase the likelihood that non-
compliance will be detected, and increase the political and economic costs of cheating.
Within thirty days of the EIF date, states parties will be obligated to provide detailed information regarding
their CWs programs, including CWs in their possession, CWs transferred to or received from other states, and
chemical weapons production facilities (CWPFs). Members will provide information on CWs in their
possession, as well as their storage location, quantity, type, Chemical Abstracts Service (CAS) registry
number, and a draw-down schedule for their destruction (Article III.1.(a).(i–iii, v)). The exact location of CWs
storage facilities, accompanied by a detailed site diagram, must also be provided (Verification Annex:
IV.A.1.(b)). An inventory of equipment and chemical precursors related to the process of mating chemical
agents with munitions and delivery systems will also be declared (Verification Annex: IV.1.(c).(iii–iv)).
Declarations on CWPFs are to include their location, a history of ownership, a detailed site diagram, type of
CWs or munitions processed, the plants production capacity, and yearly records of the quantity of CWs
produced (Verification Annex: A.1). CWPF equipment as well as any equipment transferred or received must be
declared (Verification Annex: A.1.3).
On-site inspections and their ability to verify the accuracy of data declarations will depend largely on
verification technology. Equipment such as combined gas chromatograph-mass spectrometers (GC-MS) can
detect trace amounts of CW agent byproducts. Sampling can occur in the production line itself, or from the
waste stream, such as smoke stack discharge or other emissions (The Chemical Weapons Convention, 62). The
GC-MS functions as follows:
First, the gas chromatograph vaporizes the sample and passes it through a packed column or a hollow glass
capillary tube with a fine polymer material. Various substances in the sample take different amounts of time to
emerge from the tube, depending on their molecular weight and their attraction to the polymer lining. As they
emerge from the chromatography, constituents of the sample are then introduced into a mass spectrometer,
which breaks them up into a compound-specific set of molecular fragments and then measures their masses
very precisely (Select Committee on Intelligence, 32).
Additionally, unattended monitoring surveillance systems, designed to achieve continuous monitoring of
facilities, will compliment the sampling activities. An internal computer records continuously and the
equipment is designed to be tamper-proof (The Chemical Weapons Convention, 63).
The CWC and the U.S. National Interest
Compliance and Enforcement
Proponents of the Convention readily acknowledge that the treaty will not guarantee absolute compliance.
However, non-states parties will have several incentives to join the regime and to comply with the mandates of
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the treaty once they are members. In the interim, the Convention will make the acquisition of CWs and their
precursors increasingly more difficult. A recent OTA report indicates that there are approximately twenty states
with CWs or the capability to produce such agents; including Iraq, Iran, Syria, North Korea, Libya, India,
Pakistan, Israel, China, South Korea, Ethiopia, Chile, Afghanistan, Thailand, South Africa, Laos, Myanmar
(formerly Burma), and Brazil (Senate Foreign Relations, 163). Two-thirds of these states have signed the
Convention, but Chile, Ethiopia, Lao Peoples Democratic Republic, and South Africa are the only states yet to
ratify (OPCW Webpage). Critics argue that the CWC will be unable to influence the behavior of non-ratifiers
nor capable of influencing the political calculus determining ratification decisions. The Convention will be able
to influence the behavior of these states at several levels, furthering the goals of U.S. non-proliferation policy.
A major goal of the CWC is for the Convention to serve as a confidence-building measure and to create an
international environment in which members are sufficiently reassured that other states, particularly regional
rivals, are not engaging in CWs production. The aims of universality and effectiveness depend on the incentives
for ratification and the potential costs that rogue states will face through non-compliance. A Convention backed
by the majority of states and the global powers, a condition yet to be achieved given the current U.S. absence,
will serve to establish an internationally accepted standard against CWs. This norm against production,
possession, development, transfer, and use will have two effects. In states with politically accountable
governments, being labeled an untrustworthy nation may make continued non-compliance politically damaging.
As Oran Young, a Professor from Dartmouth College, stated:
A reputation for trustworthiness is one of the most valuable assets that any member of international society
can acquire. . . . The costs of becoming stigmatized by others as a rule breaker may be quite severe, as many
Third World states have discovered. (75).
The CWC will create the international standard by which states will be judged. While many non-
compliant or CW capable states are currently not politically accountable to their domestic populations, an
international standard against such action is essential if rogue activity is to be universally condemned. The
establishment of an international norm against CWs, with the hope that the rogue label will serve to influence
states, is consistent with U.S. foreign policy objectives aimed at furthering the number of democratic states. As
nations move toward democracy, political accountability will evolve; the existence of an international standard
used to judge non-compliance is essential if domestic voices and international condemnation are to influence
policy makers. Similar to the history of accession to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, over time, a cost-
benefit analysis performed by rogue states may well reveal the political costs associated with non-compliance
(Senate Foreign Relations, 179).
Both the Convention’s financial incentives for states parties and sanctions for non-compliant states will
also further the goal of universality. The Convention mandates that:
the State Parties shall:
Undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of chemicals,
equipment and scientific and technical information relating to the development and application of chemistry
for purposes not prohibited under this Convention.
Not maintain amongst themselves any restrictions, including those in any international agreements,
incompatible with obligations undertaken in this Convention, which would restrict or impede trade and the
development and promotion of scientific and technological knowledge in the field of chemistry for industrial,
agricultural, research, medical, pharmaceutical or other peaceful purposes (Article XI.2.(b)–(c)).
This prohibition against trade restrictions among members is aimed at international supply-side control
organizations, such as the Australia Group (the organization of industrialized states with large chemical
industries), whose purpose is to restrict the trade of dual-use technologies and precursors to states seeking CWs
capabilities. Australia Group export prohibitions will not apply to states parties to the Convention. This trade
incentive is intended to persuade states seeking the development of a domestic chemical industry that
ratification of the Convention will further their legitimate economic agenda.
Evaluation of the Chemical Weapons Convention 11
Conversely, restrictions on trading chemicals on the Schedule of Chemicals (Annex 1) are designed to
prevent non-states parties from acquisition of precursors, and to create an additional incentive to ratification. The
export of Schedule 1 chemical precursors, as of the EIF date, is restricted to states parties (The Chemical
Weapons Convention, 13). Regarding Schedule 2 chemicals, an end-use certificate, outlining the chain of
custody of the chemicals, is required for non-states parties. Three years after the EIF date, the trade with non-
members in Schedule 2 chemicals is banned (The Chemical Weapons Convention, 13). End-use certificates are
required for Schedule 3 chemicals, with the possibility of more stringent restrictions five years after the EIF date
(The Chemical Weapons Convention, 13). Former Secretary of State Warren Christopher explained before the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee the effect that trade restrictions will have on rogue states seeking CWs
capabilities:
The CWC will have a deterrent effect on CW proliferation and put new pressures on countries that remain
outside the treaty. A country like Libya that requires foreign assistance to begin or further develop a CW
program would find it more difficult since states parties will be prohibited from assisting anyone in activities
banned by the CWC and will also be required to ban trade with non-states parties in certain chemicals that
could be used to make chemical weapons (181).
Opponents have frequently used this line of reasoning to attempt to exhibit the Convention’s flaws, by
arguing that a state with indigenous CW production capability would not be adversely effected by a restriction
in the trade of chemicals. However, this logic is flawed. First, while some non-states parties may have
developed indigenous production capabilities, it is unlikely that they are self-sufficient in the various types of
precursors needed to produce CWs. With the exception of the United States, the majority of the industrialized
world—the source of a high percentage of the production of chemical precursors—have ratified the CWC.
Furthermore, both critics and supporters of the treaty agree that the Convention will not ensure 100 percent
compliance. No treaty involving sovereign nations can claim universal adherence, nor are treaties intended to do
so. Rather, the Convention establishes an internationally recognized prohibition of a class of weaponry, with the
aim of influencing through political and economic means, states currently in non-compliance. At the very least,
the trade restriction called for in the Convention will make the acquisition of CWs and their precursors on the
international market more difficult and increase the likelihood of detection. Regardless of U.S. ratification, rogue
states will exist; however the ability of the treaty to influence behavior would be greatly enhanced with U.S.
participation.
Sanctions
The procedures for addressing non-compliance and the potential array of sanctions against cheating are not
explained in detail in the Convention. Minor non-compliance violations are to be dealt with internally.
Measures to redress a minor violation would include the suspension of voting rights and all privileges normally
reserved for a state party. A member in non-compliance will also be subject to economic sanctions, such as the
ones imposed on non-ratifiers, until non-compliance is addressed (Article XII.2). For more serious cheating, the
Convention lists two possible means of redress. First, the Conference of States Parties can recommend
collective measures against violators (Article XII.3); or, if the violation is viewed as more severe, the problem
can be referred to the U.N. Security Council (Article XII. 4). It is important to note that the Convention places
no restrictions on unilateral action, with the obvious exception of CW use, against a state party; this might
include sanctions, the severing of diplomatic relations and foreign aid or military intervention. The lack of
specificity in this area undoubtedly means that it will be addressed early on in the life of the OPCW, which is
another compelling reason for U.S. ratification prior to EIF.
Russia and Compliance
Reliable estimates of the CW stockpile amassed by the Soviet Union indicate that Russia inherited 40,000 tons
of CW agents, making Russia the largest CW possessor in the world. The question of Russian compliance, as
the CWC awaits ratification in the Duma, is of concern to both supporters and critics. The inspection of
Russian CW installations and CW destruction facilities will be implemented by a U.S. inspection team, in
accordance with the Wyoming MOU, and the BDA. The Wyoming MOU, examined earlier, has progressed
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toward fruition with the signing of Phase II of the MOU in 1994; this commits the United States and Russia to
exchange data declarations and allow on-site inspections of several declared facilities (Senate Foreign Relations,
203). Data declarations have been exchanged, and U.S. teams have inspected three Russian CWPFs. The
bilateral inspections have increased the pool of knowledge on U.S.–Russian stockpiles—further decreasing
levels of mistrust—and have provided valuable inspection lessons that will assist future on-site inspections of
Russian sites.
The June 1990 BDA is still awaiting ratification in the Duma (Senate Foreign Relations, 205). The BDA
was pursued in the late 1980’s when it was thought that the CWC EIF date would be decades away. The BDA
institutes a CW destruction time line, calling for the total elimination of United States and Russian arsenals by
2002 (Select Committee on Intelligence, 43). The BDA’s inspection regime is virtually identical in scope to
the CWC regime (Select Committee on Intelligence, 43). The CWC permits the implementation of bilateral
agreements consistent with the purpose of the treaty. While the BDA is not as crucial as it was prior to the
signing of the CWC, continued bilateral progress serves as a confidence-building indication that Russia will
comply with the mandates of the Convention.
United States failure to ratify the CWC will have negative effects on the future of Russian CW destruction
and the prospects for Russian ratification of the treaty. A non-compliant United States would allow Russia to
delay ratification of both the BDA and the CWC by contending that the reciprocal intent of the BDA has been
annulled. Further, it would destroy the trust which has been established in recent years in the area of CW
destruction. The absence of both the United States and Russia, the two largest CW possessor states, from the
Convention would further legitimize CW possession and impede the success of the regime’s goal in influencing
the behavior of non-members. The intention of moving states toward ratification, based on the solidarity of
international opinion, is unlikely to have the desired effect on rogue nations—such as Libya, Iran , and North
Korea—when the United States and Russia are absent from the regime.
Russian development of novel CWs, whose precursors are yet unknown or absent from the Schedule of
Chemicals, is another concern. For example, in 1994, Vil Mirzayanov, a Russian scientist, revealed that the
Russian CW program had developed a new nerve agent, A-232, which was composed of precursors absent from
the Schedule of Chemicals. New agents, critics argue, would be unverifiable due to the novelty of their
precursors. The prospects for detection of non-compliance with novel agents, however, are the same for CW
agents which are currently known, Any large scale production, storage, or munitions-filling operation would be
subject to the scrutiny of the international inspectorate and the National Technical Means (NTM) of the United
States. Additionally, the General Purpose Criterion allows for the inclusion of previously unknown agents and
their precursors to the Schedule of Chemicals. In fact, Mirzayanov has repudiated his earlier concerns regarding
the inability of the CWC to deter and detect novel agents:
Initially, I too objected to the CWC, which I assessed as being inadequate for the task of eliminating
chemical weapons. . . . What I did not understand when I first spoke out on these issues is that the CWC’s
negotiators build flexibility into the CWC to permit it to adapt to new scientific and technological
developments. This adaptability was prudent because science does not stand still. The treaty contains
provisions to permit additions to the list of banned and controlled chemicals and to improve inspection
techniques and technologies to keep pace with such developments (Senate Foreign Relations, 202).
The CWC Verification Regime and U.S. Intelligence Capabilities
The verification regime of the OPCW will serve to increase the ability of the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC)
to monitor CW proliferation threats by focusing attention on non-ratifiers and providing additional information
from data declarations. Non-parties to the Convention would naturally be of greater concern that those states
which have ratified the treaty and are submitting to the inspection regime. The verification regime will also
enhance the IC’s access to information by allowing data declarations and information yielded from inspections
to be compared with intelligence gather by other means. The IC will be charged with collecting information on
potential proliferators regardless of the Senate’s impending decision, but acceding to the treaty will increase its
capabilities, as well as the information available for analysis. As former CIA Director James Woolsey indicated
in congressional testimony.
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it is to this broader mission that the (Convention) can make a contribution by increasing the amount and
type of information available to the intelligence community and by providing a basis for comparison with
information the United States currently obtains by other means. This information could then be used either to
build confidence where all information is consistent or flag suspicions where there are inconsistencies or
omissions. . . . [The Convention serves as another] tool to add to our collection . . . with a broad applicability
which can help resolve a wide variety of problems. . . . We will know more about the state of chemical warfare
preparations in the world with the treaty than we would know without it (Senate Foreign Relations, 178).
Chemical Defenses
Proponents of the treaty have frequently contended that the U.S. ratification of the CWC will lull the United
States into a false sense of security, resulting in a decreased focus on chemical defense research and increased
vulnerability of U.S. troops. This argument is incorrect at several levels. First, supporters of the treaty
recognize that the CWC is far from a panacea eliminating CWs but argue that it will serve to make the
acquisition of CWs more difficult, as well as deter potential acquisition and use. Chemical defense programs
will continue to have high priority among U.S. defense planners, regardless of the ratification decision made in
the Senate. Former Director of Central Intelligence John Deutch testified that:
The Department of Defense will maintain a robust chemical defense capability supported by aggressive
intelligence collection efforts. To ensure that our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines are the best protected
and best equipped fighting force for operations on a nuclear, chemical, or biological (NBC) battlefield, we
have, with the support of Congress, developed a centralized management process that serves to coordinate
the services requirements in these areas. Our NBC defense programs will continue in accordance with the
provisions of the treaty and we will continued to provide our forces with the best protection available
(Committee on Armed Services, 36).
A chemical defense program is divided into four areas: protection, detection, decontamination, and
treatment (CBW Threat, 6). Protection aims at preventing the CWs from contacting the body, whatever its
mode of action. Examples include gas masks and protective overgarments. Detection seeks to increase the
warning time between CW release and the exposure of troops. Decontamination acts to eliminate the agent as a
threat by treating the CW with neutralizing chemicals (CBW Threat, 7). The last stage of CW defense are the
medical countermeasures, either pretreatment to increase the bodies resistance, or therapy post-CW exposure
(CBW Threat, 7).
The Convention itself is clear on the issue of a member’s right to develop defenses against CWs:
Nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as impeding the right of any State Party to conduct research
into, develop, produce, acquire, transfer, or use means of protective equipment against chemical weapons, for
purposes not prohibited under this Convention (Article X.2)
The inclusion of Article X, referenced above, has also created controversy, with respect to its creation of a
voluntary fund for states parties which are threatened with, or victims of, CW attack. Voluntary assistance,
including CW defense systems, scientific and technical information, and additional resources will be available
to members (Article X.1,3,5,7,10). At issue here is the contention that the fund will increase the CW defense
capabilities of rogue states, increasing their confidence in engaging in chemical warfare. However, it is unlikely
that rogue states would have access to such information. Non-states parties would have no access to the
voluntary fund. States parties in non-compliance will have all rights and privileges suspended, including the
Article X provisions (Article XII.2). Further, the fund outlined in Article X is strictly voluntary, as former
Director of Central Intelligence John Deutch continued:
The United States is not required to provide assistance directly to any State Party attacked with chemical
weapons. Article X only obligates States Parties to provide assistance for CW protective measures through
the international Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). It does not require
routine assistance in peacetime, nor does it require any type of security assurances beyond the provision of
CW defensive equipment or funds to acquire such equipment (Committee on Armed Services, 51).
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Riot Control Agents
One area of controversy surrounding the CWC is the status of riot control agents (RCAs). The text of the
Convention is clear on the intended interpretation of RCAs: they are prohibited as a method of warfare (Article
I.5). The Convention defines an RCA as “any chemical not listed in a schedule, which can produce rapidly in
humans sensory irritation or disabling physical effects which disappear within a short time following the
termination of exposure” (Article II.7). This definition subjects RCAs to the general purpose criterion, the
prohibitions enumerated in Article I, based on the definition of toxic chemicals, which includes “any chemical
which through its chemical action on life processes can cause . . . temporary incapacitation” (Article II.2). The
rapid production of sensory irritation or disabling effects would, by definition, result in temporary
incapacitation.
The divergence of interpretations stems from the purposes not prohibited under the Convention. Purposes
not prohibited by the general purpose criterion are:
• Industrial, agricultural, pharmaceutical, or other peaceful purposes;
• Protective purposes, namely those purposes directly related to protection against toxic chemicals and
protection against chemical weapons;
• Military purposes not connected with the use of chemical weapons and not dependent on the use of toxic
properties of chemicals as a method of war;
• Law enforcement including domestic riot control activities (Article II.9).
Opponents have argued that the prohibition of RCAs as a method of warfare and the exemption of activities
not prohibited by the Convention raises several verification problems and will constrain legitimate military
purposes. First, critics contend that the sole limitation on RCAs is found in Article I.5, prohibiting their use as
a method of warfare. The extension of this interpretation would mean that RCAs are exempted from the
Convention’s general purpose criterion prohibiting stockpiling, production, retention, and the transfer of CWs
(Article I.(a)–(d)). This exemption would liken the status of RCAs to the no-first-use standards of the Geneva
Protocol. This reading of the Convention is both incorrect and dangerous to the purpose of the treaty (Chayes,
2). Article I.5’s inclusion is intended to clarify the ambiguous nature of RCAs in the Geneva Protocol. U.S.
representatives during the Geneva Protocol negotiations argued that RCAs were outside the boundaries of the
treaty. Article I.5 is designed to prevent this interpretation, which is clearly inconsistent with the intent of the
treaty. An RCA exemption would mitigate the desired confidence-building effect of the treaty.
Potential loopholes regarding the purposes not prohibited by the Convention were also raised by
opponents. They argue that development of new agents, whose chemical precursors, due to their novel
composition, are previously unknown to the industry and the Convention, could be developed under the veil of
law enforcement, peaceful industrial use, or military purposes not associated with the use of CWs as a method
of warfare. However, an attempt to produce CWs under the guise of law enforcement or other legitimate
purposes would run a high risk of detection. While RCAs could be produced for law enforcement purposes, an
attempted marriage of RCAs with military munitions would subject such agents to the general purpose
criterion. The production of militarily significant levels of agents would increase the likelihood of detection.
The storage facilities and munitions production facilities would be subject to international inspection, facing the
risk of detection.
Furthermore, the Convention places a one-ton limit on the retention of scheduled chemicals for law
enforcement purposes (Verification Annex: VI.2.(c)). The intent of this exemption, demanded by U.S.
negotiators, is to enure that instruments of capital punishment, such as lethal injection or the gas chamber,
would remain viable options. A one-ton supply of agents has little military utility, as evidenced by the U.S.–
Soviet bilateral accord, in which the parties agreed to retain 5,000 tons of CW agents, regarded as the baseline
supply for military utility. An attempt to retain a larger stock of agents, or their storage in munitions, would
run the same risk of detection as any other violation.
The Convention also lacks a clear definition of “law enforcement.” Critics argue that the use of RCAs
could be legitimized by claiming that their use was in support of law enforcement objectives. International law
defines law enforcement as “actions taken within the scope of a nation’s ‘jurisdiction to enforce’ its national
law” (Chayes, 3). International law interpretations provide that a state may enforce its own law within its own
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territory or against its own citizens, but that it may not enforce its national law in the territory of another state
without that state’s consent. According to the Convention’s guidelines, these same rules apply to the use of
toxic chemicals in law enforcement (Chayes, 3).
The Convention does not ban the use of RCAs “for purposes not connected with the use of chemical
weapons and dependent on the use of the toxic chemicals as a method of warfare” (Article II.9(c)). A U.N.
sponsored peacekeeping operation, under the law enforcement criteria, would be justified in using RCAs against
non-combatants, proved they serve no military objective. The justifiable uses of RCAs for purposes not
regarded as serving a “military objective” include rescue missions where noncombatant are interfering with the
operation, or against rioting prisoners of war who, by definition, are noncombatants (Chayes, 5). RCA use in
cases such as the protection of supply lines or against civilians shielding combatants would be banned because
their use would serve a specific military objective (Chayes, 5).
The CWC and the U.S. Chemical Industry
The negative effects of the CWC on the U.S. chemical industry, ranging from the regulatory burden to the theft
of trade secrets, have been arguments used by critics of the Convention. Arguments include the burdensome
nature of reporting requirements, the opportunity cost of delaying production during inspections, and the
potential loss of confidential business information as a result of economic espionage committed by foreign
nationals on inspection teams. In reality, U.S. failure to ratify the treaty would inflict far greater damage to the
U.S. chemical industry than the potential costs of compliance. Concern for the fate of the chemical industry is
well-founded, as the industry is a vital element of U.S. competitiveness. The U.S. chemical industry is
composed of 20,000 chemical manufacturing plants, accounting for one-third of the world’s chemical production
capacity. In 1991, the U.S. chemical industry accounted for $85.5 billion in exports of chemical raw materials
and specialty organic chemicals (The Chemical Weapons Convention, 9). U.S. companies also exported $292.3
billion worth of primary, intermediate, and formulated chemicals in the same year (The Chemical Weapons
Convention, 9). In 1995, over $60 billion in chemical products and technology were exported, netting a $20
billion trade surplus in the chemical field (Senate Foreign Relations, 214). In 1992, the chemical industries net
exports totaled $16 billion, a significant contribution to U.S. competitiveness, given that the merchandise trade
deficit that year was $93 billion (The Chemical Weapons Convention, 10). The industry employs 846,400
people nationwide, with a total payroll of $31 billion (The Chemical Weapons Convention, 9).
U.S. failure to ratify the Convention could be disastrous for the chemical industry. The export standards of
the CWC, reviewed in the compliance section, place specific restrictions on states not party to the treaty. As of
the EIF, the U.S. chemical industry would be excluded from the trade of Schedule 1 chemicals. Three years after
the EIF date, trade restrictions on Schedule 2 chemicals would go into force. Furthermore, the industry would
be faced with a competitive disadvantage in the international market for Schedule 3 chemicals. U.S. companies
would require end-use certificates for all imports and exports of Schedule 3 chemicals. Opponents of the treaty
argue that the precursors in Schedules 2 and 3 compose only a small percentage of total U.S. exports, but
restrictions on segments of the U.S. industry are likely to resonate in other areas.
Although Schedule 2 chemicals account for a relatively small portion of the U.S. chemicals, the impact on
U.S. firms will likely affect trade in other chemicals as well. Companies tend to shop where there are no
restrictions and prohibitions, therefore restrictions/prohibitions on trade in Schedule 2 chemicals will
likely have a cascading effect on the overall chemical industry. Since there is ample foreign availability in the
industrialized world, Japanese and European companies will undoubtedly move to fill the gap in authorized
supply that the absence of U.S. availability would create (Senate Foreign Relations, 219–220).
The United States is the only member of the G-7, the leading group of industrialized nations, that has yet
to ratify the CWC. Conservative estimates by the Chemical Manufacturers Association (CMA) indicate that
failure to ratify the Convention could cost the U.S. chemical industry over $600 million per year (Jacobs, 5).
The potential economic costs associated with additional regulation are minor compared to the loss in
competitiveness which non-compliance will cause. As Fred Weber, President of the CMA, told the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee:
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Fewer than 2,000 American companies will be directly affected [by the Convention]. Of that number, less
than 200 are likely to ever have an on-site inspection. . . . It won’t put companies out of business. And it
won’t keep lifesaving pharmaceuticals off the market. Chemical manufacturers are America’s single largest
exporting sector. We exported over $60 billion in products and technology last year, with a $30 billion
trade surplus. . . . If the United States does not ratify the treaty, that status will change. Our largest trading
partners are also party to the Convention, and will be forced to apply trade restrictions to chemicals that
originate here, or that are being shipped here. . . . Potentially hundreds of millions of dollars of lost sales, for
no other reason than the United States is not part of the CWC (Senate Foreign Relations, 215).
Industry attitudes have towards CW disarmament have changed markedly over the years, especially in the
1970’s. As evidence of extensive use of herbicides and napalm in Vietnam by the United States came to light,
the U.S. chemical industry began to perceive that military production of CWs created negative public opinion
(The Chemical Weapons Convention, 10). Additionally, private-industry production of CWs had been reduced
to a negligible level, as production was internalized within the United States Army. A broad-based industry
consensus recognized that its interests would be best served by participating in the negotiation of a CW ban,
rather than attempting to comply with a treaty on which the industry had little influence (Olson, 99). The CMA
officially stated its support for a complete CW ban in 1978. In 1987, the CMA moved to establish a working
group which met regularly with U.S. government representatives to voice concerns relating to ongoing
negotiation (The Chemical Weapons Convention, 10).
Broad-based chemical industry support for the CWC exists in the United States and worldwide. The
CMA, representing 180 U.S. companies that constitute over 90 percent of the U.S. productive capacity,
supports the treaty. Related trade groups, such as the Synthetic Organic Chemical Manufacturers Association,
the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, the Biotechnology Industry Organization, and the
American Chemical Society have all issued their formal support for the ratification of the Convention (Senate
Foreign Relations, 214).
The CWC and U.S. Leadership
While the potential economic loss facing the U.S. chemical industry from a failure to ratify the Convention
serves as a persuasive argument for Senate approval, it is hardly the only factor supporting ratification before the
EIF date. Operating on the assumption that the United States decides to delay ratification, the result would be
the forfeiture of a window of opportunity to protect U.S. national interests in the infant OPCW. Delay would
mean the loss of a seat, for at least the first year, on the executive council, a position guaranteed to the United
States. Failure to ratify before the EIF date would also lead to a U.S. absence in the Conference of States
Parties. John Holum, Director of the United States Arms and Control and Disarmament Agency, explained the
significance of U.S. non-involvement in the early stages of the OPCW’s existence:
During the critical months of the CWC’s implementation, a thousand small decisions will be made and
myriad precedents and habits will be set that we will want to play a role in. Establishing the practical
mechanisms of routine and challenge inspections is just one example of a process that will be shaped early on
and will greatly affect U.S. interests. Given the negotiating history of the Convention, it would be not just
unwise, but deeply ironic, if we lost our momentum at this critical last stage (Senate Foreign Relations, 176).
U.S. failure to ratify the Convention before the EIF date could also have serious ramifications for U.S.
international stature. The United States has supported the negotiation of numerous arms control agreements. An
abandonment of the Convention as it nears fruition would signify a U.S. retreat from the fight against the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Unilateral efforts to prevent transfers of destabilizing technology
and armaments would be weakened as the U.S. commitment to stem proliferation becomes suspect.
Furthermore, the legitimacy and effectiveness of the Convention itself may be affected by the absence of the
United States. U.S. non-involvement could have serious ramifications for enforcement and compliance issues
within the OPCW, as well as cases where noncompliance is raised within the U.N. Security Council. As retired
senior U.S. officials Brent Scowcroft and John Deutch have argued:
rejecting a treaty of which we were the primary architects and instead lining up with the pariah states such as
Libya, Iran and North Korea would do real damage to America’s international leadership, credibility, and
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interests. By remaining outside the CWC, we let these rogue states off the hook by making it easier for them
to ignore pressures to abandon chemical weapons. . . . It gives Russia—which has the world’s largest stock
of chemical weapons—an easy excuse to delay further its own accession to the CWC (Washington Post, 21).
In summary, U.S. status as a non-signatory could have the effect of diluting the power of the Convention
and weakening U.S. international credibility by aligning the United States with rogue nations as non-ratifiers.
As Norman Schwarzkoph said, “I would just as soon not be associated with those thugs in this particular
matter” (Lugar and Biden, 19).
The Constitutionality of the CWC
Among the more contentious issues surrounding the U.S. ratification of the CWC is the constitutionality of the
verification regime. The structure of the U.S. government is such that all treaties entered into must comply with
the Constitution. As the supremacy clause states:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all
Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of
the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of
any State to the Contrary notwithstanding (Article VI, clause 2).
This legal hierarchy demands that any law or treaty must be legally aligned with the Constitution. The
supremacy of the Constitution over treaties was reinforced by Reid v Covert, in which the Supreme Court held
that “This Court has regularly and uniformly recognized the supremacy of the Constitution over a treaty” (354
U.S. 1;1957). Within the second level of the established legal hierarchy, congressional statutes and
international treaties are regarded as having equal legal standing. When a federal law and an international
agreement come into conflict, the standard of lex posterior is applied, meaning that the more recent statute takes
precedence (Koplow, 158).
In the context of U.S. involvement in arms control treaty negotiations, the CWC has greater potential for
risking constitutional challenges than previous initiatives. First, the CWC calls for the inspection of both
government and private property. Previous arms control agreements, such as the Strategic Arms Limitation
Talks (SALT), and the Biological Weapons Convention, focused exclusively on government facilities and
resources. While the negotiation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty included minor impositions
into the private sector, the magnitude of potential CWC intrusion is unparalleled (Koplow, 163). The
verification annex of the Convention appears to limit the ability of private parties to invoke constitutional
protection. In reference to challenge inspections, the Convention states:
In meeting the requirements to provide access as specified in paragraph 38 (General Rules on Conduct of
Inspection), the inspected State Party shall be under the obligation to allow the greatest degree of access
taking into account any constitutional obligations it may have with regard to proprietary rights or searches
and seizures. The inspected State Party has the right under managed access to take such measures as are
necessary to protect national security. The provisions in this paragraph may not be invoked by the Inspected
State Party to conceal evasion of its obligations not to engage in activities prohibited under this
Convention (Verification Annex: X,C,41).
Given the Convention definition of a state party, which regards any territory or place, including the
property of a private party, to be subject to the obligations of the Convention, paragraph forty-one seems to
imply that private parties are restricted from invoking constitutional protection. University of Illinois Professor
of Law Ron Rotunda indicates:
it appears that this protection of the Fourth Amendment does not apply to protect private parties. Only the
United States, not a private individual, can invoke this paragraph [paragraph 41 of the Verification Annex],
because only the United States is the “inspected State Party.” Only the United States (not a private party)
can ratify the treaty (19).
Additionally, the verification regimes underpinning agreements like the SALT accords and the later
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) agreements depended more on the utilization of National Technical
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Means (NTM), such as aerial and satellite surveillance. In contrast, the verification regime of the CWC consists
of on-site inspections, complimented by a state’s NTM. While the United States will, of course, continue to
use NTM to gather intelligence, the verification challenges of CWs and their production facilities limit the
value of these intelligence gathering systems.
A second element of the treaty which raises issues of legality is the composition of inspection teams. The
international inspectorate, designated by the technical secretariat, consists of representatives of the states parties
to the Convention. Opponents have charged that foreign inspectors could be used as agents for the members to
spy against private companies and U.S. military installations. The problematic element here is that the United
States Constitution protects citizens from invasion of privacy only from the government itself. Intrusion by an
international organization via foreign nationals may invalidate a Constitutional claim for compensation for theft
or seizure of confidential business information. The Appointments Clause of the Constitution (Article II,
Section 2, Clause 2) seeks to ensure that those who exercise federally granted power, such as an inspector, are
responsible to the citizens, and to prevent the manipulation of appointments by a branch of the government
(Adams, 9–10). As University of California at Berkeley Professor of Law John Yoo explained:
In addition to authorizing a search, CWC officials actually carry out the on-site inspections, a marriage of
powers that no domestic law enforcement agency enjoys. This Constitution forbids the federal government
from delegating this public function to a private or nongovernmental entity; it is almost axiomatic that
individuals who are not members of the federal government cannot exercise federal power upon the
individual rights of an American citizen (Wall Street Journal, A22).
However, given the status of the relationship of the federal government and the representatives of the
technical secretariat, the judiciary is likely to regard the inspection team as a legal representative of the
government, acting under the guise of federal law. Judicial precedence exists in which conditions of “joint
endeavors” between the public and private sector have been accorded constitutional protection (Lustig v United
States, 338 U.S. 74). In relation to the issue of foreign inspectors, opponents argue that an international
inspector could obtain trade secrets or military information in the course in on-site inspections. However, the
U.S. government can exclude an inspector from participation in on-site inspections within U.S. territory.
Within thirty days of the EIF date, the technical secretariat will submit the name, nationality, and rank of
inspectors scheduled to be designated as members of the international inspectorate, to all states parties
(Verification Annex: Part II,1). Each state party may indicate its non-acceptance of an inspector, accompanied by
the reason for exclusion, to the OPCW within thirty days of receipt of the list (Verification Annex: II,2). In the
event that information justifying exclusion of an inspector is obtained after this deadline, a state party is
permitted to exclude the inspector (Verification Annex: II,4).
Both forms of inspection specified under the CWC—routine and challenge—present Constitutional issues
due to the nature of the searches. Most important, no warrant is required for the initiation of either type of
search. A key constitutional question is whether the type and degree of intrusion demanded by the verification
annex of the CWC violates the Fourth Amendment, which says:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, homes, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon reasonable cause, supported by
Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
The courts have established a two-pronged test to determine the existence of a “reasonable expectation of
privacy,” the basis for a Fourth Amendment violation. In Katz v United States, the case which produced the
test, Justice Harlan wrote, “There is a two-fold requirement, first that a person has exhibited an actual
(subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize
as ‘reasonable’” (398 U.S. 361). The CWC will affect the property of private persons on a larger scale than any
previous arms control agreement. International inspectors are permitted to engage in “systematic verification
through on-site inspection and monitoring with on-site instruments” of public and privately owned places where
the presence of CWs are suspected (Article IV.3).
On-site monitoring activities, such as the inspection of waste emissions or aerial observation, do not pose a
constitutional issue based on the reasonable expectation of privacy standard. The courts have ruled that no
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reasonable expectation of privacy exists for garbage, on the premise that refuse materials, such as emissions, are
left in plain view, accessible to the public and the police (Koplow, 166). The use of data collection devices,
such as aerial photography, airborne sensing data, and water discharge emissions collection, could be
constitutionally permissible and are key elements to the on-site inspection regime. In Dow v United States, the
Supreme Court upheld the use of a “standard precision aerial mapping camera,” which the EPA used to collect
data on a chemical plant (476 U.S. 227). The court held that “when Congress invests an agency with
enforcement and investigator authority, it is not necessary to identify explicitly each and every technique that
may be used in the course of executing the statutory mission” (476 U.S. 233). This element of the holding
could justify the use of new verification technology for the inspection of open-view locations, as well as
emissions when a reasonable expectation of privacy is absent.
The interior of private premises subject to on-site inspection do have a reasonable expectation of privacy.
The court has consistently recognized that the Fourth Amendment criteria applies to commercial locations as
well as private homes (See v City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541,547). Therefore, a warrant would generally be
required for a legal search of commercial premises. One possible means of avoiding this warrant requirement
would be the classification of the subject of on-site inspections, the chemical industry, as a “pervasively
regulated industry.” In some cases, the standard for a reasonable expectation of privacy is applied differently for
commercial premises than private homes. This distinction lies in the relationship between the industry in
question and the government. In Dow v United States, the court reaffirmed that the government has:
greater latitude to conduct warrantless inspections of commercial property [because] the expectation of
privacy that the owner of commercial property enjoys is such that the property differs significantly from the
sanctity accorded an individual’s home (476 U.S. 237–238; reaffirmation of Donovan v Dewey, 452 U.S.
598–599).
The standard, as explained by the court, contends that:
the statute’s inspection program, in terms of the certainty and regularity of its application, provides a
constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant. . . . It is the pervasiveness and regularity of federal
regulation that ultimately determines whether a warrant is necessary to render an inspection program
reasonable under that Amendment (U.S. v Biswell 406 U.S. 314).
Three criterion must be met in order for a warrant exemption based on the existence of pervasive industry
regulation to be constitutionally valid. In regard to this exemption’s application to the chemical industry and
the CWC inspection regime, several standards exist. First, “there must be a ‘substantial’ government interest
that informs the regulatory scheme pursuant to which the inspection is made” (New York v Burger 482 U.S.
702). Since U.S. interests in furthering non-proliferation goals can certainly be called substantial, this prong of
the standard would be satisfied.
Second, the warrantless inspection must be “necessary to further [the] regulatory scheme” (New York v
Burger 482 U.S. 702). In Biswell, the court clarified this standard, contending that, “If inspection is to be
effective and serve as a credible deterrent, unannounced, even frequent, inspections are essential. In this context,
the prerequisite of a warrant could easily frustrate inspection” (406 U.S. 316). This standard is consistent with
the nature of CWPFs, and the verification problems presented by dual-use technology. Inspections must occur
quickly, as any delay could allow violators the time necessary to hide incriminating material.
It is the last criteria that presents the most difficulty for the Convention. “The statute’s inspection
program, in terms of the certainty and regularity of its application, [must] provide a constitutionally adequate
substitute for a warrant” (482 U.S. 703; italics added). In order to meet this standard, the regulatory scheme
must be “sufficiently comprehensive and defined that the owner of commercial property cannot help but be
aware that his property will be subject to periodic inspections undertaken for scientific purposes” (452 U.S.
600). The CWC’s verification scheme is difficult to define as a regime where inspections occur on a certain and
regular basis. While a chemical industry owner would be well aware of the potential for inspection, no
guidelines exist for determining which facilities are to be inspected and with what regularity. This standard
exists to check the abuse of unlimited discretion by administrative officials (436 U.S. 323). As the court held in
Donovan v Dewey:
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warrantless inspections of commercial property may be constitutionally objectionable if their occurrence is
so random, infrequent, or unpredictable that the owner, for all practical purposes, has no real expectation that
his property will from time to time be inspected by government officials (452 U.S. 599).
The nature of the inspection regime advocated by the Convention, in regard to both routine and challenge
inspections, fails to provide the certainty and regularity which would provide an owner with assurance of a
search. While that owner would be aware of the potential for such a search, this random and arbitrary system,
particularly for routine inspections, which require no proof of potential wrongdoing, would give the inspection
team the unlimited discretion which the Supreme Court has deemed unconstitutional.
On the assumption that warrantless searches would be unconstitutional, a remedy seeking to provide
adequate constitutional protection, and not interfering with the ability of the inspection regime to function
properly, must be found. The application of an administrative warrant may be such a solution for routine
inspections. Administrative warrants require federal inspectors to apply a warrant before a federal judge. This
standard does not require the advance notification of the party to be inspected, thereby eliminating the potential
for diversion as a result of early notification (The Chemical Weapons Convention, 37). Furthermore, the
standard which must be met for the warrant to be issued—administrative probable cause—is less demanding
than the standard involved in a criminal warrant. One report says:
The inspectors need only show that a specific business has been chosen for inspection on the basis of a
general administrative plan. . . . the requirement for an administrative warrant assures the interposition of a
neutral officer to establish that the inspection is reasonable and properly authorized. Administrative
warrants can only be used for searches that are conducted primarily on the basis of neutral and objective
criteria rather than on suspicion of guilt (The Chemical Weapons Convention, 37).
The intent of routine inspection is to verify the accuracy of submitted data declarations; therefore,
administrative warrants could be issued for routine inspections in the United States, without weakening the
deterrent and verification effect of the searches that advance notification might risk. However, since the intent of
challenge inspections is to uncover non-compliance, the request for an administrative warrant would be
discriminatory and would not justify its issuance (The Chemical Weapons Convention, 38). The CWC,
however, recognizes this potential constitutional problems and adequately addresses the issue. The Convention
states:
In meeting the requirements to provide access as specified in paragraph 38, the inspected State Party shall be
under the obligation to allow the greatest degree of access taking into account any constitutional
obligations it may have with regard to proprietary rights or searches and seizures (Verification Annex:
X.C.41).
The Convention will permit the United States to require that challenge inspections receive a criminal
search warrant. In these cases, the relevant evidence and information which was presented to the executive
council for the granting of the challenge inspection, will be presented at the criminal warrant hearing. Ivo
Spalatin, Director of Congressional Affairs, wrote that this type of warrant must specify:
the type of inspection authorized; the purpose of the inspection; the type of facility to be inspected; the
items, documents and areas that may be inspected; the commencement and concluding dates and times of the
inspection; and the identities of the representatives of the Technical Secretariat of the OPCW, . . . and, if
applicable, the representatives of the U.S. Government (Committee on Foreign Affairs, 90).
Conclusion
The signing of the CWC in 1993 represented a commitment on the part of the international community to
eliminate chemical weapons from warfare. The effects of CWs make banning this method of warfare an
imperative. The history of CW use, from medieval to modern times, reveals the impact which they have had in
warfare, and the horrible nature of the injuries that they inflict. The progression of arms control negotiations
toward the current CW ban has seen the slow development of a consensus against CW use. The shortcomings
of previous CW arms control agreements, such as the Geneva Protocol, highlight the need for an organization
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capable of enforcing the goals of the Convention. The OPCW is designed to ensure cooperation among its
members and implement the verification regime envisioned by the Convention.
The Convention will seek to ensure compliance based on a combination of factors. The treaty establishes
an international standard against the possession and use of CWs. Further, economic incentives in the trade of
chemical precursors for the legitimate pursuits of states parties and trade sanctions against non-members will
establish a financial motivation for states to ratify the treaty. In the event of non-compliance, the Convention has
the right to apply additional sanctions or seek the intervention of the United Nations Security Council. Russia,
the largest CW possessor state, is obligated by past bilateral accords with the United States to implement a
destruction program. Their willingness to comply with CW destruction has been exhibited in U.S.–Russian
mutual inspections, and Moscow’s CWC ratification is expected.
The verification regime of the CWC will serve as an additional tool for the U.S. intelligence community in
its attempts to detect and deter CW proliferation. The additional data and information from data declarations
and on-site inspections will complement intelligence collected by National Technical Means. Additionally,
U.S. ratification of the CWC will not, as critics argue, create a false sense of security and interfere with U.S.
chemical defense systems. The Convention explicitly permits members to engage in defensive research and
preparation. The legal framework of the treaty will also permit the use of RCAs in limited conflict and law
enforcement scenarios.
U.S. absence from the Convention will have devastating effects on the U.S. chemical industry. The
application of trade restrictions designed for rogue nations to the U.S. chemical industry could result in the loss
of up to $600 million per year. The Convention provides adequate protection against the loss of proprietary
information and will seek to ensure that inspections are conducted at a level of minimum intrusion. The United
States has played a leadership role throughout the negotiation of the Convention. Failure to ratify at this key
moment will impact both the credibility of the United States within the international community and the
enforcement capabilities of the Convention.
Lastly, given the level of intrusiveness into the private sector by the verification regime, several
constitutional questions have been raised. The text of the Convention provides flexibility to accommodate each
member state’s legal structures. The United States government will be able to implement the Convention in a
manner consistent with the Constitutional protection accorded to the public.
The United States faces a critical decision which will effect its national security, its position in the
international community, and the competitiveness of a major industry. Failure to ratify at this time will
represent an abdication of U.S. leadership in the area of arms control and prevent the United States from exerting
influence, aimed at protecting U.S. interests, within the OPCW. While the CWC is far from being a perfect
treaty, the support of the major powers, including the United States, and a genuine commitment from all
nations towards CW disarmament will further the goal of codifiying a CW ban in international law.
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